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OPEN JUSTICE AND PRIVACY 
 
PAUL WRAGG* 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How is the law to react when a claimant wishes to conceal the fact of his arrest for fear that 
damage to his private and family life and/or reputation would occur if it was known?  It is a 
well-established legal principle that legal proceedings should be heard in public and freely 
reported.  This is subject to the exceptional circumstances in which the administration of 
justice would be disserved by this publicity.  Should those accused of terrible crimes, but not 
charged, be protected by this exception?  This is a subject that has attracted relatively little 
critical comment in the academic literature, despite its prominence in the public debate, 
particularly following high profile arrests under Operation Yewtree and other such police 
investigations.1  By examining the case law, including the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Khuja (formerly PNM) v Times Newspapers Ltd,2 and by focusing upon privacy law, it will 
be argued that the critical question for the law to determine is not whether such reporting is 
harmful but whether it amounts to (or would amount to) wrongdoing.  Only in those 
circumstances can it be said that publication would be an actionable misuse of private 
information (the ³PLVXVH claim´  7R HVWDEOLVK WKLV SRLQW LW ZLOO EH VDLG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
section, that open justice amounts to a constitutional principle of the highest order.  With that 
in mind, it will be argued, in section three, that, where open justice is at stake, there can be no 
presumptive equality between the right to privacy and the right to free speech, as is usually 
the case in misuse claims; there is a clear presumption that open justice will be protected.  In 
section four, it will be argued that the balancing act, which determines misuse claims, must 
be modified so that the claim cannot succeed unless publication amounts to (or would amount 
to) wrongdoing.  This novel framework explains the decision in Khuja, and others, and gives 
better normative shape to future decision-making in the area. 
 
2. OPEN JUSTICE 
 
The principle of open justice can be put simply: justice demands transparency in the use of 
official power.  %HQWKDPVDLGLWEHVWµ3XEOLFLW\LVWKHYHU\VRXORIMXVWLFH¶3  It plays a vital 
role in the rule of law.  Publicity informs citizens of the law, as applied by the judiciary, so 
that they may moderate their behaviour accordingly.4  It informs them of their societal 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Leeds; Associate Fellow of the Honourable Society of the Inner 
Temple.  Some of this article draws upon, with kind permission, comments published on the Inforrm blog, 
µ'LVWLQJXLVKLQJKDUPIURPPLVXVHLQSULYDF\Oaw: Khuja v Times Newspapers¶-XO\ 
1
 For general discussion, see Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act 
(OUP, 2006), 167-197; Eric Barendt, Jason Bosland, Rachael Craufurd-Smith & Lesley Hitchens, Media Law: 
Text, Cases & Materials (Pearson, 2014), 603-646; Helen Fenwick et al, Fenwick on Civil Liberties and Human 
Rights (Routledge, 2017, 5th edn), 352-363. 
2
 [2017] UKSC 49. 
3
 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 4, (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843), 316.  Lord Shaw refers to these 
passages in his judgment in Scott v Scott (1913) AC 417, 477, discussed below. 
4
 See, Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, (Yale University Press, 1969, 2nd edn.), 33-94. 
obligations and the penalties arising from breach of those obligations.5  As Bingham notes, 
this is important not only for day to day life but also in commerce.6  On the latter, KHVD\VµQR
one would choose to do business, perhaps involving large sums of money, in a country where 
WKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVZHUHYDJXHRUXQGHFLGHG¶7  Equally, as Bentham also tells 
us, publicity JXDUGVDJDLQVWLPSURELW\µLWNHHSVWKHMXGJHKLPVHOIZKLOHWU\LQJXQGHUWULDO¶8  
In this way, as the House of Lords has previously recognised, open justice is a µsafeguard 
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy and maintains the public confidence in the 
administration of justice¶9  Likewise, it performs a pivotal role in ensuring there is equality 
before the law.  By knowing the identity of the parties to the claim, and the witnesses, we 
may be assured that the power, wealth or fame of those involved does not afford them special 
privileges.  As Bingham also SXWLWµWKHUHVKRXOGQRWEHRQHODZIRUWKHULFKDQGDQRWKHUIRU
WKHSRRU¶10  Open justice also guards against retrospectivity and inconsistency: it allows the 
SXEOLFWRPRQLWRUWKHSURPLVHWKDWLQ+D\HN¶VZRUGVµJRYHUQPHQWLQDll its actions is bound 
E\ UXOHV IL[HGDQGDQQRXQFHGEHIRUHKDQG¶11  This, Raz argues, includes observance of not 
just the courts but also the crime-SUHYHQWLQJ DJHQFLHV WR HQVXUH WKHLU µGLVFUHWLRQ«>LV@ QRW
DOORZHGWRSHUYHUWWKHODZ¶12 
 For these reasons, the open justice principle applies equally to the publication of the 
proceedings themselves as it does to evidence communicated to the court, at least in criminal 
proceedings.13  In this way, the public can be assured that the evidence presented to the court 
has been treated in the proper way, according to the law.  If this were not the case then, as the 
House of Lords recognised in Scott v Scott,14 decisions at first instance would be 
unassailable:  
 
µLISHUSHWXDOVLOHQFHZHUHHQMRLQHGXSRQHYHU\RQHWRXFKLng what takes place at a hearing in camera [ie, 
in private], the conduct and action of the judge at trial, his rulings, directions, or decisions on questions 
of law or fact, could never be reviewed in a Court of Appeal at the instance of a party aggrieved, unless 
indeed upon the terms that the party should consent to become a criminal and render himself liable to 
be fined and imprisoned for criminal contempt of Court, a serious invasion of the rights of the 
VXEMHFW¶15 
 
Thus, the administration of justice relies upon accurate and fair accounts of proceedings. 
For these reasons, it may be said that open justice consists of both an internal and 
external dynamic.  Internally, the parties involved in the proceedings ± either the person 
prosecuted or the parties to civil litigation ± can be assured that they have received a fair 
hearing; a right which is guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights ³(&+5´.  Externally, the general public can be assured that the probity of the 
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judiciary and other public agencies (such as the police) are monitored and that the principle 
of equality before the law is maintained.  This last point is achieved by the public naming of 
the parties and witnesses involved in the case.  Where those individuals are not named, there 
is a risk that these guarantees are jeopardised.  For one thing, we cannot know for sure that 
they have been treated as others would be.  Additionally, and significantly, if the parties or 
witnesses are not named then justice may be disserved by the prevention of new or further 
evidence coming to light about those individuals or, alternatively, the absence of any such 
evidence arising may be given proper significance.16  The importance of this was made plain 
recently when the press reported that (now disgraced) former TV presenter Stuart Hall had 
been arrested for non-recent sexual offences against three victims.  This prompted a further 
ten victims to make complaints, adding to the overwhelming evidence against him.17 
 In this way, both the internal and external elements of open justice are underpinned by 
the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, ECHR.  As Lord Steyn recognised in Ex 
parte Simms IUHHVSHHFKDFWVµDVDVDIHW\YDOYHpeople are more ready to accept decisions 
that go against them if they can in principle seek to influence them.  It acts as a brake on the 
abuse of power by public officials.  It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and 
administration of justice of the country¶18  In ex parte Simms, free speech served the internal 
G\QDPLF E\ DOORZLQJ WKH SULVRQHUV WR µFKDOOHQJH WKH VDIHW\ RI WKHLU FRQYLFWLRQV¶19  The 
external dynamic (as well as the internal) is achieved through public dissemination of 
judgments and knowledge of the evidence presented to the court.  In the UK, this is done 
either by the court itself (eg, the Supreme Court does this) or by the Incorporated Council of 
Law Reporting, which publishes the decisions of superior and appellate courts in England and 
Wales.  It is also achieved by the commercial press reporting on cases.  In this way, the 
SXEOLF¶VULJKWWRNQRZLVSDUDVLWLFRQWKHSUHVV¶VULJKWWRUHSRUWIUHHO\As Baker argues, the 
public reporting of criminal trials by the press is the paradigm example of a right to receive 
information about state action.20  This has been recognised by the courts.  For example, the 
European Court of Human Rights has said: 
 
µZKLOVW WKH PDVV PHGLD PXVW QRW RYHUVWHS the bounds imposed in the interests of the proper 
administration of justice, it is incumbent on them to impart information and ideas concerning matters 
that come before the courts just as in other areas of public interest. Not only do the media have the task 
RILPSDUWLQJVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLGHDVWKHSXEOLFDOVRKDVDULJKWWRUHFHLYHWKHP¶ 21 
 
7KXV WKH SXEOLF¶V OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI MXVWLFH DGGV ZHLJKW WR WKH
strength of the free speech right at stake should the court seek to curtail open justice. 
 The significance of the open justice principle is also recognised in the academic 
literature.  Institutional openness is a feature of the Rawlsian social contract.22  This includes 
the opportunity to know, and critique, the workings of not only the judicial system but also 
the agents of public power, especially the police.  As Hayek warns, this sort of transparency 
is a vital distinction between the liberal and totalitarian state.  As he argues, it is important 
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that state institutions do not seek to pre-determine the worth of this information (ie, a report 
of legal proceedings) since intellectual freedom is recognised by its capacity to make 
innovative leaps and is valued for its capacity to criticise state power so as to advance social 
progress.23  In other words, the state should not determine what citizens need to know; only 
citizens themselves can make this judgement, through critical discernment.  These lofty ideals 
are realised through the functional work of open justice which, as Robertson reports, 
µHQKDQFHV SXEOLF NQRZOHGJH DQG DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH ZRUNLQJV RI WKH ODZ «assists the 
GHWHUUHQWIXQFWLRQRIFULPLQDOWULDOVDQG«SHUPLWVWKHUHYHODWLRQRIPDWWHUVRIJHQXine public 
LQWHUHVW¶24 
 It follows that the open justice principle is not absolute.  It may be restricted where it 
is necessary to do so.  But it is important to note that these circumstances must be exceptional 
if the sanctity of the open justice principle is to be maintained.  In doing so the court must 
have regard not only to the specifics of the case before them but also the general effect that 
any curtailment gives rise to.  This point is particularly well stated in Scott v Scott when Lord 
Shaw recognised µWKH JUDGXDO LQYDVLRQDQGXQGHUPLQLQJRI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO VHFXULW\¶ WKURXJK
the ready use of exceptions.25  He expounded this point by alluding to the risk of (a sort of) 
despotism resulting from ready use of discretion:  
 
µWKHUHLVQRJUHDWHUdanger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of rules of 
procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves.  I must say frankly that I think these 
encroachments have taken place by way of judicial procedure in such a way as, insensibly at first, but 
now culminating in this decision most sensibly, to impair the rights, safety, and freedom of the citizen 
DQGWKHRSHQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIODZ¶26  
 
Lord Woolf also recognised this importance in the Court of Appeal decision in ex parte Kaim 
Todner in which he emphasised the danger of undermining the general principle through the 
accretion of exceptions from analogy.27 
 In Scott v Scott, the House of Lords was adamant that exceptions should arise only in 
limited circumstances and, even then, only when it could be said that the proper 
administration of justice would be served by exercise of the discretion.  In Viscount Haldane 
LC¶VRSLQLRQWKLVZDVUHVWULFWHGWRFDVHVLQYROYLQJµWKHZDUGRUWKHOXQDWLF¶DQGFDVHVZKHUH
the effect of publLFLW\ ZRXOG EH µWR GHVWUR\ WKH VXEMHFW-PDWWHU¶ RI WKH DFWLRQ HJ FHUWDLQ
breach of confidence claims).28  7KXV WKH H[FHSWLRQV VSHDN WR µD \HW PRUH IXQGDPHQWDO
SULQFLSOHWKDWWKHFKLHIREMHFWRIWKH&RXUWVRIMXVWLFHPXVWEHWRVHFXUHWKDWMXVWLFHLVGRQH¶.29  
Lord Halsbury echoed this concern and noted that the H[FHSWLRQµZKHUH MXVWLFHPD\QRWEH
GRQH¶VKRXOGnot be understood more broadly than Haldane intended.30  Lord Loreburn also 
emphasised that µLI WKH &RXUW LV VDWLVILHG WKDW WR LQVLVW XSRQ SXEOLFLW\ ZRXOG LQ WKH
circumstances reasonably deter a party from seeking redress, or interfere with the effective 
WULDORIWKHFDXVH¶WKHQUHVWULFWLRQLVMXVWLILDEOH 
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 3. PRIVACY & OPEN JUSTICE 
 
So far, the discussion has focused upon court proceedings themselves.  There is the related 
issue of how the press reports arrests.  This is a perennial issue, though one attracting greater 
publicity in light of Operation Yewtree: the police investigation into non-recent allegations of 
sexual offences by Jimmy Savile, on his own and with others, and non-recent allegations of 
sexual offences conducted by others unconnected to him.31  There have been a number of 
high profile arrests in which the arrestee has been named without being formerly charged or 
prosecuted.  In some cases, this has resulted in litigation against the police, including Sir Cliff 
5LFKDUG¶V privacy lawsuit against the BBC and the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
police.  His property was raided, in circumstances of considerable publicity, by police 
investigating historic sexual abuse (although this was not an operation Yewtree case).32  In a 
later newspaper article, Geoffrey Robertson QC derided WKH LQFLGHQW DV µXQDFFHSWDEOH¶33  
Others have been prosecuted but have been acquitted, both as part of Operation Yewtree and 
outside of it.  This includes Michael Le Vell, an actor from the long-running TV soap opera, 
Coronation Street $IWHUKLVDFTXLWWDOIROORZLQJZKDWKLVIULHQGGHVFULEHGDVµWZR\HDrs of 
KHOO¶34 79 SUHVHQWHU 3KLOOLS 6FKRILHOG WZHHWHG µ,W¶s bloody ridiculous a mans [sic] life & 
reputation can be so comprehensively trashed in this way.¶ 
 These examples show how the administration of justice can generate conflict with the 
right to reputation and to a private and family life under Article 8, ECHR.  It is 
understandable that arrestees should complain that the fact of arrest has tarnished their 
reputation and damaged their home life by throwing unwarranted suspicion upon their 
character.  This is especially aggrieving if, as with Sir Cliff Richard, it is several years 
between, in his case, the highly-publicised raid on his property and the quiet admission that 
no charges would be brought against him.  This sort of concern was central to the recent High 
Court decision in ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd.35  The Mail on Sunday had learned that 
Company A, the claimanW¶V FRPSDQ\ DQG &RPSDQ\ % ZKLFK KDG D EXVLQHVV UHODWLRQVKLS
with A) had been raided by police investigating alleged financial crime.  This event had been 
reported by the local press.  The Defendant wished to publish an article about this event, 
which would acknowledge no one had yet been charged with any offence (and, in fact, it did 
publish such an article on the MailOnline).  A follow-up story was published after several 
people were arrested, further to the raid, although it appears these people were not connected 
to Company A.  Meanwhile, the claimant had been interviewed under caution by the police as 
part of an investigation into his suspected involvement with financial crime.  After the 
claimant sought an injunction to prevent publication of this information, the defendant 
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undertook not to publish it without giving notice (of not less than 24 hours).  The claimant 
was successful, for reasons that deserve our attention. 
 The claimant claimed that publication would be a misuse of private information.  As 
is well-established, the test for this tort, at interim relief proceedings, requires the court to be 
VDWLVILHG WKDW WKHFODLPDQW LV µPRUH OLNHO\ WKDQQRW¶ WR VXFFHHGDW IXOO WULDO36  To do so, the 
claimant must establish that the invasion of privacy, under Article 8, ECHR, would be of 
greater magnitude than the interference with freedom of expression, under Article 10, ECHR.  
The court in ERY IRXQGWKDWWKHUHZDVµQRUHDOULVN¶WKDWWKHIDFWRIWKHFODLPDQW¶VLQWHUYLHZ
under caution would be published JLYHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VXQGHUWDNLQJ not to do so without at 
OHDVW  KRXUV¶ QRWLFH.37  %XW LW UHFRJQLVHG WKH FODLPDQW¶V µPRUH JHQHUDO FRQFHUQ¶ WKDW WKH
defendant may imply suspicion of WKH FODLPDQW¶V involvement with financial crime.38  
Arguably, in its decision to grant an injunction to the claimant, the court, in its handling of 
WKHEDODQFLQJDFWIHOOLQWRHUURULQWZRZD\VE\PLVVWDWLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VREOLJDWLRQVWR
the claimant under Art 8 and (2) by failing to acknowledge the public interest in press reports 
of police activity. 
 As to the former, the court held that the FODLPDQW KDG µD UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
privacy in the inIRUPDWLRQWKDWKHLVEHLQJLQYHVWLJDWHGE\WKHSROLFH¶39  It did so by reference 
to paragraph 3.5.2 of the Guidance on Relationships with the Media issued by the College of 
Policing, which states, amongst other things, that the identity of those arrested or suspected of 
crime should not be realised to the press or public, save in limited circumstances.  The court 
also referred to Lord Justice /HYHVRQ¶V VWDWHPHQW to the same effect in his report on press 
ethics.  It further noted that the Data Protection Act 1998 ³'3$´ also defines the 
commission or alleged commission of a crime as sensitive personal data.40 
 The court, though, recognised that the DPA was irrelevant since (a) it had not been 
SOHDGHGDQGEWKHVSHFLDOH[HPSWLRQIRUWKHPHGLDµZRXOGQRGRXEWEHLQYRNHG¶HYHQLILW
was.  But the reliance on both the CollegHRI3ROLFLQJJXLGDQFHDQG/HYHVRQ/-¶VVWDWHPHQW
canQRWVXSSRUWWKHSRVLWLRQUHDFKHGE\WKHFRXUW)LUVW/HYHVRQ/-¶VVWDWHPHQWLVLQQRZD\D
proposition of law; it is a recommendation from a public inquiry.  Secondly, the obligations 
imposed on the police are not the same as those imposed on the press.  The police are a public 
DXWKRULW\ZKRXQGHUVRIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW³+5$´PXVWDFWFRPSDWLEO\ZLWK
WKH (&+5  7KH\ PXVW WKHUHIRUH WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW D VXVSHFW¶V $UWLFOH  DQG $UWLFOH 
rights when deciding whether or not to name them.  But the press is not a public authority and 
does not fall under s 6.  It owes no such obligations to the claimant.  It is wrong, therefore, to 
equate the two.  The claim that the claimant would have against the police, if they were to 
name him, is not of the same magnitude as it is against the press.  If the police had disclosed 
this information (we are told they did not)41 then the misuse claim would be strengthened by 
the fact of disclosure, but only as against the police; the press has no such obligation to the 
claimant.  7KH FRXUWPLJKWKDYHKDG UHJDUG WR WKH FODLPDQW¶V FODLP WKDWSXEOLFDWLRQZRXOG
jeopardise his health and disrupt the life of his child (albeit with the reservations set out 
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below) ± but, curiously, the court stated it had reached its decision without regard to such 
interests.42 
 $V WR WKH ODWWHU SRLQW DERYH FRQFHUQLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V $UW  ULJKWV WKH FRXUWV
treatment of that, for the purposes of balancing, is unpersuasive.  The defendant had pleaded 
that the story concerned a matter of public interest.  The court concluded that the injunction, 
though, would not prevent the defendant publishing the investigation into Company A.  In 
doing so, it accepted, or seemed to, that there was no public interest in reporting that the 
claimant was being investigated by the police or, alternatively, (though this is not stated in 
the judgment) that the public interest in this information was outweighed by the strength of 
the privacy claim.  The court was satisfied that the order suppressing this information could 
EH GLVFKDUJHG RU YDULHG RQ  KRXUV¶ QRWLFH WR WKH FODLPDQW, though only if there was a 
µVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHRIFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶LQWKHVWDWXVRIWKHSROLFHLQYHVWLJDWLRQ.43 
 This reasoning seems arbitrary.  If there is a public interest in reporting the police 
investigation into the company, then why not also the claimant?  In reporting such matters, 
the press must, of course, take care not to cause a substantial risk of seriously prejudicing 
future proceedings, but that was not a live issue here (or, if it was, it was not mentioned).  It 
should be recognised that the Supreme Court has previously held that where public interest 
expression is at stake, the circumstances in which an injunction may be granted to prevent 
publication are very narrow.44 
 Perhaps it may be said that ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd is not an open justice 
case.  That view, though, would restrict the administration of justice to legal proceedings.  
Yet if we understand open justice as concerned with the exercise of public power, the actions 
of the police must form part of the definition.  The same issues apply.  The question of how 
the police act, who they arrest, how they treat the powerful and wealthy, as compared to the 
ordinary man, are all questions about the use of official power.  That they happen outside the 
court room should make no difference to the application of the principle.  There will be 
circumstances where an arrest ought to be kept secret (for example, in the case of organised 
crime, where the arrest of one member may prompt others to go to ground) but these will be 
exceptional. 
 The judicial treatment of open justice in misuse claims may be criticised at a broader 
level.  Ordinarily, in misuse claims, neither Article 10 nor Article 8 is treated as having 
presumptive priority.  This was made clear by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd45 
and, subsequently, in Re S,46 ZKHUHLWZDVVWDWHGµneither article has as such precedence over 
the other¶47  In an open justice case, though, as Re S was, this claim seems indefensible.  In 
Scott v Scott, open justice is shown to be a constitutional principle of the highest order.  
9LVFRXQW+DOGDQH/&HPSKDVLVHGLWLVµRIPXFKSXEOLFLPSRUWDQFH¶48  Lord Atkinson said it 
ZDVµRIYDVWLPSRUWDQFH¶49  Lord Shaw described it DVµDVRXQGDQGYHU\VDFUHGSDUWRI the 
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FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶.50  Lord Loreburn called it a µSULFHOHVVLQKHULWDQFH¶.51  This special treatment can 
EH VHHQ LQ RWKHU FDVHV  ,W KDV EHHQ VDLG WKDW µit is impossible to over emphasise the 
importance to be attached to the ability of the media to report criminal trials.  In simple terms 
this represents the embodiment of the principle of open justice in a free country¶.52  It is also 
plain that the open justice principle and freedom of expression are inseparable: as the Court 
RI $SSHDO KDV DOVR VDLG RSHQ MXVWLFH LV µEXWWUHVVHG¶ E\ $UW 10.53  Even in Re S, the court 
recognised WKDWµWhe ordinary rule is that the press, as the watchdog of the public, may report 
everything that takes place in a criminDOFRXUW¶.54  In this way, it may be said that open justice 
is parasitic on freedom of speech.  It depends upon publicity to be realised.  Once this is 
understood, the right to freedom of speech takes on a different character and becomes of 
higher value than competing rights.  Professor Barendt has been critical of the apparent 
weakening of the presumptive equality rule that sort of reasoning entails, which he identifies 
in other cases.55  But in light of these statements by the court, it is hard to see why Art 8 
should be thought presumptively equivalent.  Moreover, the subordination of the open justice 
principle to the level of individual privacy, even in principle, brings the judiciary under 
VXVSLFLRQ  $V 6PROOD KDV DUJXHG µ>D@ VRFLHW\ WKDW ZLVKHV WR WDNH RSHQQHVV VHULRXVO\ DV D
YDOXH PXVW «GHYLVH UXOHV WKDW DUH GHOLEHUDWHO\ WLOWHG LQ IDYRXU RI RSHQQHVV LQ RUGHU WR
counteract the inherent proclivity of governments to engage in control, censorship and 
VHFUHF\¶56  This places the court in an invidious position; since it is in its own interests to 
shade its reasoning from public scrutiny, censorship, even in part, of its judgment must occur 
exceptionally.  It cannot be the case, therefore, that the court is as indifferent to open justice 
as it is between individual rights; the former must be (and is) its priority.  This does not mean 
that the administration of justice cannot be served by interferences with open justice.  Clearly, 
there are circumstances in which individual rights take priority.  But given that, as will be 
shown, the circumstances in which open justice may be interfered with are narrower than the 
circumstances in which privacy may be interfered with; there can be no equivalency between 
the two. 
 One elegant solution to this problem would be for the court to hold that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy arises in an open justice misuse case.  In this way, the principle of no 
presumptive priority would remain undisturbed.  The court would be saying, in effect, that no 
privacy interests arise so that there would be no need to consider which of the two rights ± 
privacy or free speech ± was of greater significance on the facts.  This, though, would be an 
unsatisfactory treatment of the problem.  Where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the claim ends ± without any analysis of the free speech at stake.57  This, though, does not 
capture the issues.  It is not that there can be no prima facie privacy case where open justice 
is at stake; but, rather, that there is no claim where freedom of expression is not misused.  
Therefore, there must be an analysis of the speech claim before a decision is reached.  This 
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means that there must be engagement ZLWK WKH VHFRQG SDUW WKH µEDODQFLQJ DFW¶ RI WKH
Campbell test. 
 
4. STRIKING THE BALANCE: MISUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM HARM 
 
If (it is accepted that) there is no presumptive priority for Art 8 in a misuse of private 
information claim involving open justice, then how is the court to strike the balance between 
the two claims?  It will be argued in this section that the parallel exercise, in which both 
rights are examined, must be different to other misuse claims because of the strong 
constitutional presumption in favour of Article 10 protection.  The question of harm plays an 
important part in this analysis.  But, crucially, the presence of harm is not determinative.  
Specifically, as will be argued, the question for the court is not whether interference with 
open justice is necessary to avoid serious harm to the claimant, but to identify whether the 
harm to the claimant results from a misuse of the open justice principle.  In this way, it is not 
the existence but the cause of the harm that is most important to deciding the case. 
 This can be shown by considering the minority judgments in the Supreme Court case 
of Khuja (previously PNM) v Times Newspapers Ltd.58  The claimant was referred to by name 
in a criminal case at the Old Bailey.  He obtained an injunction preventing his identity from 
being published in newspaper reports about the proceedings.  The case involved a matter of 
serious public concern.  At the time, the claimant was on bail following arrest.  The 
injunction was granted on the basis that identification might seriously prejudice his right to a 
fair trial, should later proceedings arise against him.  After his de-arrest, though, the 
newspapers sought discharge of the injunction.  The claimant resisted by claiming publication 
of his arrest on suspicion of sexual offences against children would undermine his right to 
respect for his private and family life (as well as damaging his reputation).  The Supreme 
Court agreed with the court of first instance that the principle of open justice trumped the 
FODLPDQW¶V$UW ULJKWV /RUG.HUUDQG/RUG:LOVRQGLVDJUHHG 7KH\FODLPHGWKHPDMRULW\
had fallen into error by not recognising the harm caused to the claimant.  In their judgment, 
the majority, and the courts below, had been wrong to conclude that the general public 
understands that a person is innocent until proven guilty.  This, they said, was a legal 
presumption with no standing in reality.59  This assumption led to error because it meant the 
EDODQFLQJDFWFRQGXFWHGE\ WKHFRXUWKDG IDLOHG WR WDNH LQWRDFFRXQW µWKHULVNRISURIRXQG
harm to the reputational, social, emotional and even physical aspects of his private and family 
OLIH¶60  In their view, the Art 8 claim ought to have succeeded. 
 But this reasoning is wrong.  It assumes that the existence of harm is determinative to 
the claim.  This is not what the case law says.  In Scott v Scott, as the majority in Khuja 
acknowledged,61 it was accepted that realisation of the open justice principle may cause harm 
to persons involved in the case.  Lord Atkinson put this most explicitly:  
 
µ7KHKHDULQJRIDFDVHLQSXEOLFPD\EHDQGRIWHQLVQRGRXEWSDLQIul, humiliating, or deterrent both 
to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so 
indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in 
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public trial is to found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient 
administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect.¶62 
 
This has been restated more recently (though prior to the HRA era) by Hoffmann LJ (as he 
then was):  
 
µ1HZVSDSHUVDUHVRPHWLPHVLUUHVSRQVLEOHDQGWKHLUPRWLYHVLQDPDUNHWHFRQRP\FDQQRWEHH[SHFWHGWR
be unalloyed by considerations of commercial advantage. Publication may cause needless pain, distress 
and damage to individuals or harm to other aspects of the public interest. But a freedom which is 
UHVWULFWHGWRZKDWMXGJHVWKLQNWREHUHVSRQVLEOHRULQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLVQRIUHHGRP¶63 
 
Lord Kerr¶V and Lord :LOVRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LV DOVR XQsupported by philosophical argument.  
Liberal tradition treats harm as a necessary but not sufficient reason to interfere with liberty.64  
As John Stuart Mill argued,65 there are all manner of harmful circumstances that do not 
automatically warrant state intervention.  To his examples may be included unrequited love, 
adultery, dismissal, competition, redundancy, house repossession, poverty, humiliation.  To 
the extent these instances are litigable, the law requires evidence of wrongdoing.  This is 
where Lords Kerr and Wilson fell into error.  Their minority judgment is devoted to showing 
how .KXMD¶VFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHFULPLQDOFDVHZRXOGGRKLPJUHDWKDUP:KDWWKH\ do not 
show, though, is how a fair and accurate report of court proceeding would amount to a misuse 
of private information causing harm. 
 Before turning to what they ought to have done, let us consider the facts of Scott v 
Scott to be assured that harm of itself is not misuse.  Of course, Scott v Scott is not a misuse 
of private information case.  But it is a proto-privacy claim.  It concerned divorce 
proceedings that had been held in private.  The subject matter of these proceedings was 
delicate.  The petitioner obtained evidence confirming she was a virgin.  She alleged the 
respondent was impotent.  He denied this but subsequently withdrew that claim.  After the 
decree nisi was issued, the respondent intimated to others that the divorce proceedings 
resulted from his ex-wife being of unsound mind.  She dispatched a transcript of proceedings 
to her ex-KXVEDQG¶V IDWKHU VLVWHU DQG DQ XQQDPHG WKird person to prove otherwise.  The 
question for the court was whether this constituted an actionable contempt of court.  As noted 
above, the House of Lords accepted that this information would cause harm to the 
UHVSRQGHQW¶VUHSXWDWLRQDQGZHPD\DGGIDmily life, albeit that phrase is not used).  But that 
was not sufficient to disapply the open justice principle. 
 Clearly, Scott v Scott should not be viewed anachronistically.  There is no suggestion 
that a right to privacy is at work in that case ± and, of course, the ECHR did not exist then.  
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or to others, does not justify interference. 
But it reinforces the idea that the common law responds to wrongdoing and not simply harm.  
This is very clear from the majority decision in Khuja.  Lord Sumption, with whom Lord 
1HXEHUJHU /DG\ +DOH /RUG &ODUNH DQG /RUG 5HHG DJUHHG IRXQG WKDW µWKH SUHVHQW DSSHDO
must be approached on the footing that there is a real risk that a person knowing of these 
matters would conclude that PNM [Khuja] had sexually abused the complainant 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKDWKHKDGQHYHUEHHQFKDUJHGZLWKDQ\RIIHQFH¶66 
 If harm is not the determinative factor, when should the right to freedom of 
expression give way to a privacy (or any other competing rights) claim?  As noted above, the 
misuse of private information tort claim requires the court to balance the strength of the two 
respective claims.  But, following Khuja and in light of Scott v Scott, it seems unsafe to 
assume that the test in Campbell (which was not an open justice claim) maps neatly onto an 
open justice case since the two rights cannot be said to be presumptively equal.  In this way, 
it can be argued that the House of Lords in Re S fell into error by assuming that it could. 
 Whilst the ultimate test is (as it must be doctrinally and ought to be normatively) 
whether the strength of the privacy claim is outweighed by the strength of the free speech 
claim,  
a gloss is required on how this balancing act is realised.  In Khuja, as in Scott v Scott, the 
Supreme Court maintained that an exception to open justice is permissible only where statute 
allows it or where the administration of justice requires it.67  But, as Viscount Haldane LC 
made clear in Scott v Scott, the ODWWHUH[FHSWLRQWXUQVµQRWRQFRQYHQLHQFHEXWRQQHFHVVLW\¶68  
7KLV VKRXOG UHTXLUH WKH FRXUW WR H[DPLQH WKH VRXUFH RI WKH µKDUP¶ DQG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
remedial action.  As is plain, in Khuja, the source is the prospective response of the wider 
audience to Mr Khuja.  His family, his friends, his colleagues, his business associates and the 
wider public may think him guilty of a crime he has not committed.  We can imagine these as 
circles within circles representing a community separated in its proximity to Mr Khuja and, 
so, divided in his power to address them.  Mr Justice Tugendhat addressed the prospective 
LPSDFWRIDQLQMXQFWLRQLQ.KXMD¶VIDYRXURQZKDWZHPLJKWFDOOHUWKHLQQHUFLUFOHLHWKDW
group of people most closely connected to him):  
 
µVRPHNQRZOHGJHRIZKDWKDGEHHQVDLGDERXWKLPDW WKH WULDOZRXOGVSUHDGDPRQJWKRVHZKRNQHZ
him personally or by name, so that restrictions on press reporting would be of little if any benefit to 
him or his family.  Indeed, the prohibition of media reporting might lead to the circulation of ill-
LQIRUPHGRUPLVOHDGLQJYHUVLRQVRIZKDWZDVVDLGWKDWZRXOGDJJUDYDWH310¶VVLWXDWLRQ¶69 
 
He might have added that Mr Khuja can address this circle directly, including any misgivings 
they might have about his involvement.  He would be most able to press home the advantage 
of his complete vindication in the eyes of the law.  Similarly, Mr Khuja could also have 
discussions with his colleagues, business associates and customers/clients (the second circle) 
to ensure they knew of his innocence.  It may be assumed that these interactions would not be 
as intense, unguarded or intimate as a conversation with friends and family, but he would at 
least have the capacity to address these individuals directly if he wished.  In the remaining, 
third circle, we might include everyone else, specifically those who do not know Mr Khuja or 
only know of him through his involvement with these criminal proceedings.  Apart from 
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public statements, Mr Khuja may have no way of addressing his innocence with these 
individuals.  But he could have recourse to the law if these individuals ± or those from the 
first and second group ± were to defame him, harass him or otherwise invade his privacy due 
to his involvement in the criminal proceedings. 
 These considerations speak to the question of necessity.  Since Mr Khuja can, in the 
first place, address concerns amongst his personal and professional ties and, otherwise, may 
have recourse to the law to protect his reputation and private life, it cannot be said that an 
injunction would be the only means by which to safeguard justice.  It may not even be said 
that an injunction would be the best means given the opportunity for misinformation that 
Tugendhat J refers to.  Perhaps some might say that this position would not serve justice; that 
SUHYHQWLQJSURVSHFWLYHGDPDJHWR0U.KXMD¶VSULYDF\RUIDPLO\OLIHZRXOGEHPRUHMXVWWKDQ
compensation after the event.  7KLV WKRXJK ZRXOG EH WR LJQRUH WKH ODZ¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW
damages are the primary remedy in privacy and defamation proceedings and are an adequate 
remedy.70  As Dr Scott has argued: 
 
µ1RRQHZRXOGDUJXHWKDWPRQHWDU\FRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHORVVRIDQH\HFDQ restore sight to the victim... 
Nevertheless, assuming that they were awarded at a sufficiently high level, damages would be 
JHQHUDOO\XQGHUVWRRGWREHIDLUDQGMXVWVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGKHQFHDQHIIHFWLYHUHPHG\¶71 
 
Admittedly, as Dr Hughes argues in UHVSRQVHWKHWZRVFHQDULRVµDUHGLIIHUHQWLQPDQ\ZD\V¶
EXWFKLHIO\EHFDXVHµthere is no opportunity for the law to intervene to prevent the physical 
LQMXU\WKDW6FRWWGHVFULEHV¶72  %XWLQDQRSHQMXVWLFHFDVH'U6FRWW¶VYLHZKDVYDOXH 7KH
wrong is not done by revealing the information that X was a party to legal proceedings or a 
material witness.  The wrong is done by the assumptions ± and, to be clear, misassumptions ± 
that arise from the reader contriving to insert additional details to this bald statement.  So, 
whereas, in a case like Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd,73 the harm to the claimant 
arises from publication of the information itself that reveals, in great detail, features of the 
FODLPDQW¶VSHUVRQDOOLIHWKDWLVQRWWKHFDVHZKHUHOHJDOproceedings are reported accurately.  
In other words, the personal injury claim becomes comparable because, as Hughes observes, 
it would be a terrible imposition on liberty µWRUHTXLUHOHJDODXWKRULVDWLRQ¶IRUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
SURSRVHG µFRXUVH RI FRQGXFW¶74  This brings to our attention the question of wrongdoing.  
Since the press has a right to provide fair and accurate reporting of legal proceedings it 
cannot be said to have committed a wrong by doing so.  The wrongdoing is done by the 
person who takes this information and either adds false information to it ± or uses that 
information to harass, etc, the subject.  In other words, the audience becomes the prospective 
stone-thrower.  If, as with the stone-thrower, there is no opportunity to intervene before that 
event then damages following lawsuit is the only means of providing redress. 
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 This focus on wrongdoing explains the nature of the exceptions to the open justice 
principle.  The Supreme Court in Khuja identified these as set by the law of contempt, the 
law of defamation and the law protecting Convention rights.75  In contempt, the exceptions 
speak to, for example, the risk of prejudicing legal proceedings by deterring victims or 
witness from participating in, or by undermining the prospects of, a fair trial; or the extra 
protection that children and vulnerable groups receive from public intrusion (eg, victims of 
sexual offences); or, as in certain breach of confidence and misuse of private information 
claims, that revealing the information would destroy the purpose of proceedings.  In 
defamation, injunctions may only be granted in rare cases, according to the rule in Bonnard v 
Perryman,76 where, as the court put it in Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd µLWLVFOHDUWKDW
QRGHIHQFHZLOOVXFFHHGDWWULDO¶77  This lends itself to the claim that the wrongdoing must be 
particularly severe to justify interim relief. 
 This approach should be followed for Art 8.  The court should be satisfied (1) of 
wrongdoing and (2) that that wrongdoing could only be addressed through the issuance of 
interim relief or an order for anonymity.  This interpretation may be read into the Supreme 
&RXUW¶V DVVHVVPHQW LQ Khuja, of the Art 8 cases involving open justice, albeit they might 
have expressed the significance of wrongdoing more explicitly.78  This quality is an important 
qualifier to the statement in Scott v Scott that WKH µH[FHSWLRQV >WR WKHRSHQ MXVWLFH UXOH@ DUH
themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief object of Courts of 
Justice must be to VHFXUH WKDW MXVWLFH LV GRQH¶79  %XW WKH WKLQ FRQFHSW RI µMXVWLFH¶ DQG LWV
antonym must be handled FDUHIXOO\  ,W FDQQRW EH WKDW KDUP WR D SDUW\¶V DXWRQRP\ DQGRU
dignity is sufficient to meet this standard since the facts of Scott v Scott clearly point away 
from that conclusion.  7KHQHFHVVLW\RIµZURQJGRLQJ¶LVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHRWKHUZLVHDVLQD
case like Khuja, a passionate plea could be made that to permit him to be named is to do him 
a gross injustice since, as the Supreme Court recognises, the broader audience (that third 
JURXS RI SHRSOH PHQWLRQHG DERYH PD\ ZHOO IRUP WKH ZURQJ LPSUHVVLRQ WKDW WKHUH LV µQR
VPRNHZLWKRXWILUH¶%XWWRSURWHFWKLVULJKWWRUHVSHFWWRDSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\OLIHLQWKHVH
circumstances, would be to exaggerate the right and treat it as absolute.  It would be to say 
that the risk of wrongdoing in others, not the speaker itself, justifies interference with the 
right to freedom of expression.  In this way, it would be to prioritise Art 8 concerns in open 
justice cases and so invert the priority of the rights, as set out above. 
 This can be shown by considering how the court treats Art 2, the right to life, and Art 
3, the prohibition on torture, which are absolute rights.  In Venables v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd,80 the court accepted evidence that the threat of murder or serious physical 
harm against child-killer Jon Venables and Robert Thompson were of sufficient weight to 
MXVWLI\LQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHSUHVV¶VULJKWWRSXEOLVKDQ\LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHPWKDWFRXOGOead 
to discovery of their whereabouts.  ,WLVZRUWKVHWWLQJRXWWKHFRXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJLQIXOO 
 
µ,WLVDYHU\VWURQJSRVVLELOLW\LIQRWLQGHHGDSUREDELOLW\WKDWRQWKHUHOHDVHRIWKHVHWZR\RXQJPHQ
there will be great efforts to find where they will be living and, if that information becomes public, they 
will be pursued.  Among the pursuers may well be those intent on revenge.  The requirement in the 
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Convention that there can be no derogation from the rights under articles 2 and 3 provides exceptional 
support for the strong and pressing social need that their confidentiality be protected.¶81 
 
6HWDJDLQVWWKLVLVWKHFRXUW¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHSURVSHFWLYH$UWFODLP 
 
µI am uncertain, for instance, whether it would be appropriate to grant injunctions to restrict the press in 
this case if only article 8 were likely to be breached.  Serious though tKHEUHDFKRIWKHFODLPDQWV¶ right 
to respect for family life and privacy would be, once the journalists and photographers discovered 
either of them, and despite the likely serious adverse effect on the efforts to rehabilitate them into 
society, it might not be sufficient to meet the importance of the preservation of the freedom of 
expression in article 10(1).¶82 
 
It does not matter that the facts of Venables and Khuja hardly bear comparison.  The point is 
that in Venables it was understandable that freedom of expression should be restricted even 
though there would have been no wrongdoing by the press in reporting this information.83  
The serious risk to life and limb merited this exceptional treatment because Arts 2 and 3 are 
absolute rights (for these purposes). 
 Is this treatment unfair to, or otherwise dismissive of, the legitimate concern that Mr 
.KXMD¶V SULYDWH DQG IDPLO\ OLIH DV ZHOO DV KLV EXVLQHVV GHDOLQJV DUH OLNHO\ WR EH KHDYLO\
disrupted by news of his involvement?  Moreover, given the recognition that others may well 
consider him guilty despite his innocence, is there not a serious risk of damage to his mental 
well-being, which should have greater significance in the balancing act?  These are important 
points.  As Sir Richard Henriques recently noted, in his report on the Metropolitan Police 
6HUYLFH¶VKDQGOLQJRIFDVHVLQYROYLQJDOOHJHGQRQ-recent sexual offences,84 arrests can cause 
µWKH PRVW GUHDGIXO XQKDSSLQHVV DQG GLVWUHVV WR« VXVSHFWV their families, friends and 
VXSSRUWHUV«$UHSXWDWLRQ«FDQEHH[WLQJXLVKHGLQDQLQVWDQW¶,QKLVSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWSULRU
to trial, Stuart Hall VDLGµThe last two months of my life KDYHEHHQDOLYLQJQLJKWPDUH,¶ve 
never gone through so much stress in my life, and I am finding it difficult to sustain. 
Fortunately, I have a very loving family and they are very supportive, and I think but for their 
love I might have been constrained to take my own life.¶85  :KHWKHULQ+DOO¶VFDVHWKLVZDV
true or part of a deliberate ploy to manipulate the press86 is irrelevant; it is possible to 
imagine that others in his situation (who are actually innocent) would feel this way. 
 It is important to note, though it is no answer, that µthe law expects the ordinary 
person to EHDU WKH PLVKDSV RI OLIH ZLWK IRUWLWXGH DQG« FXVWRPDU\ SKOHJP¶.87  The fact of 
arrest, even for serious crime, should not be taken to have a deleterious effect on mental 
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health and personal relationships without proof of such.  But, even where there is proof, it is 
doubtful that the court would treat such as sufficient to make an exception to the open justice 
principle.  The Supreme Court decision in O v Rhodes88 lends support to this analysis.  This 
case concerned O, an eleven-year-old boy, living in the USA.  His litigation friend, his 
mother (and, subsequently, his godfather), wished to prevent his father, the musician, James 
Rhodes, from publishing within his autobiography detailed accounts of childhood sexual 
abuse and the suicidal thoughts and self-harm resulting from it.  She was concerned about the 
damaging psychological effect that such information would have on O.  The court was 
furnished with medical opinion that said WKHFRQWHQWVRIWKHERRNµZRXOGEHGHYDVWDWLQJ¶ to 
O:  
 
µ2does not have the ability to process this information in an acceptable way.  The result is likely to be 
extreme confusion, agitation and anger which would lead to enduring emotional distress... The 
cumulative effect would lead to a poor prognosis in respect of his overall functioning and likely cause 
enduring psychological harm.  In my professional opinion, exposure to this kind of material carries the 
ULVNRISK\VLFDODQGHPRWLRQDOKDUPDQGLVWKHUHIRUHDEXVLYH¶89 
 
At the Supreme Court, it was further notHG WKDW 2 VXIIHUV IURP $VSHUJHU¶s syndrome, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, dyspraxia and dysgraphia, such that:  
 
µKLVSV\FKRORJLFDOVFKHPDVDUHQRWPDOOHDEOHKHUHFHLYHVLQIRUPDWLRQLQDOLWHUDOZD\DQGLVXQDEOHWR
conceptualise it in an alternative way, and he would view himself as responsible for some of his 
IDWKHU¶s distress and [as] an extension of his father.  He is already prone to self-harm and emotional 
outbursts anGWKHVHZRXOGSUREDEO\LQFUHDVH¶90 
 
This evidence clearly shows that the harm to O would be profound.  For obvious reasons, the 
misuse claim failed at first instance and was not pursued in appeals: the information at stake 
ZDV WKH IDWKHU¶V UDWKHU WKDQ WKH FKLOG¶V DQG WKHUHIRUH SXEOLFDWLRQ FRXOG QRW DPRXQW WR D
µPLVXVH¶  It is interesting though, that Bean J, at first instance, VKRXOG QRWH µEven if the 
claimant did have some form of English law cause of action deriving from Article 8, in my 
judgment the balancing exercise would come down very firmly on the side of the fatKHU¶s 
Article 10 rights.  He wishes to WHOOWKHVWRU\RIKLVRZQOLIH¶91  The appeal proceeded based 
on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Wilkinson v Downton.92  The 
Supreme Court rejected that claim, for reasons that do not need addressing here.  But, notice 
that the court did so even though the expression at stake was conceded to be harmful to O.  In 
Baroness Hale and Lord Toulson¶Vjoint judgment,93 this effect was insufficient to justify the 
imposition of a tort that would restrict the right to freedom of expression.  As they put it: 
µFreedom to report the truth is a basic right to which the law gives a very high level of 
protection¶.94  A case like this shows how formidable the right to freedom of expression is 
when it is at stake. 
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 Perhaps some would argue that this analysis does not adhere to the proportionality 
principle, which requires the courts to interfere with rights in the least restrictive way.95  For 
example, Rhodes could still have enjoyed his free speech rights without including the harmful 
passages and so could KDYHSUHVHUYHG2¶VSULYDF\LQWHUHVWV 6RWRR WKHQHZVSDSHULQERY 
could have investigated company A without mentioning the claimant ± and the newspaper in 
Khuja FRXOGKDYHUHSRUWHGWKHFULPLQDOFDVHZLWKRXWUHYHDOLQJ.KXMD¶VLGHQWLW\%XWZHPLVV
the point of freedom of expression if we think it acceptable for judges to editorialise in this 
way; a point recognised by the Supreme Court in O v Rhodes96 and Khuja.97 
In dealing with this point, though, the judiciary may be criticised for an unnecessarily 
indulgent treatment of the free speech claim at stake.  They have stressed that full reporting, 
including names, DGGV WR WKH UHDGHU¶V H[SHULHQFH µUHDGHUV ZLOO EH OHVV LQWHUHVWHG¶ ZLWKRXW
names)98 DQGVDWLVILHVWKHFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVRIWKHSUHVVµXOWLPDWHO\VXFKDQDSSURDFK>LH
FHQVRUVKLS@ FRXOG WKUHDWHQ WKH YLDELOLW\ RI QHZVSDSHUV DQG PDJD]LQHV¶99  But these are 
irrelevant glosses.  If these were the main reasons in favour of protecting freedom of 
expression, they would be extraordinarily weak and easily put aside.  It is no concern of the 
judiciary, and no comfort to the named parties, that readers will take more satisfaction from 
their publication consequently or that the newspaper will continue to thrive, financially.  
Clearly, it would be disproportionate to protect freedom of expression in those circumstances 
at the expense of the damage done to the claimanW¶VUHSXWDWLRQDQGKLVKHUSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\
life.  Lord Neuberger saw something of this point when he said, in O v RhodesµXnless it is 
necessary to do so, I am unenthusiastic about deciding whether a book, or any other work, 
should be published by UHIHUHQFHWRDMXGJH¶s assessment of the importance of the publication 
to the public or even to the writer.¶100  There, his concern was with whether the book was 
truthful or not.  Here, our concern is whether the article is sufficiently interesting and 
attention-JUDEELQJ ZLWK D SHUVRQ¶V LGHQWLW\ LQFOXGHG RU QRW  7KH WZR DUH LUUHOHYDQW DV
questions of law.  To my mind, the unassailable significance of naming individuals is its 
contribution to the administration of justice: that this may result in other evidence becoming 
available or allowing inferences to be drawn from the absence of such.  But, the importance 
of this information cannot be quantified.  Audiences may well derive nothing of any actual 
significance from such reporting.  It may be that, in actuality, as much is learnt through 
naming an individual as not naming them.  This does not matter because there is both an 
intrinsic and instrumental value in open justice. 
This approach does not mean that the proportionality principle is ignored.  There is 
scope to protect privacy and reputational interests where the press report in a manner that 
exceeds accurate and fair reporting.  For example, this might be the case if the press were to 
GHYRWHFRYHUDJHWRDVXVSHFW¶VIDPLO\OLIHWRFRQGXFWLQWHUYLHZVZLWh his friends, family and 
work colleagues and report them; to take intrusive photographs of him and his family going 
about their daily lives.  In those circumstances, it may be said that the press has exceeded its 
right to report proceedings fairly and accurately.  But not otherwise. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Open justice is a constitutional principle of the highest order.  It is subject to the strictest 
exceptions.  It can be disapplied only when the administration of justice is disserved by 
adherence to it.  Freedom of expression is the chief vehicle by which open justice is realised.  
Consequently, it cannot be that there is no presumptive priority between privacy and free 
speech in misuse cases touching on open justice.  It must be that the misuse claim will fail 
unless the narrow exception applies.  As is evident from the discussion above, harm arising 
from publication does not satisfy this exception.  It must be shown that the information at 
stake is being misused. 
 
 
